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Thatcberism and Reagonomics: Supply-Side Economic Policy 
In Great Britain and The United States 
CHARLES REDENIUS 
The Pennsylvania State University 
The Behrend College 
Severe economic problems-a high rate of inflation, an escalating level 
of unemployment, and periodic interruptions in economic growth-have 
plagued the economies of Great Britain and the United States for most of 
the last decade. The seeming failure of traditional economic policies to 
ameliorate these problems led either indirectly or directly to the election in 
both nations of leaders determined to alter in a far-reaching way the 
economic policies of their governments. In Great Britain, the public sector 
unions' "Winter of Discontent" in 1978-79 with Labor Prime Minister 
James Callaghan's attempt to combat inflation with an incomes policy paved 
the way for the election of a Conservative government in May of 1979. In 
the United States, President Jimmy Carter's failure to advance policies that 
would improve the performance of the economy resulted in a smashing 
Republican victory in November of 1980. 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and President Ronald Reagan, con-
vinced that traditional economic policies were not only ineffective but also 
one of the principal sources of the current economic malaise, espoused an 
economic philosophy that rests on a set of economic assumptions deeply 
conservative in nature-an elitist theory of economic growth, a limited role 
for government in restoring economic health, and a belief in the "natural" 
superiority of economic laws and the market as the most efficient allocators 
of resources. These assumptions underpin the supply-side economic polici~s 
adopted by both governments. 
It is the purpose of this paper to explore the assumptions of supply-side 
economics and to sketch the similarities and differences in economic 
policies in Great Britain and the United States. The paper concludes with a 
brief look at the problems involved in measuring the impact of supply-side 
economic policies, and at a level of cultural analysis that suggests that 
economic policies are not among the principal reasons for the economic 
decline of either nation. 
THE SUPPLY-SIDE ALTERNATIVE 
The basic claim of the supply-side economic policy advocate is that the 
economic problems of the 1970s and the early 1980s are the direct conse-
quence of increasing taxes on all forms of income that reduce the financial 
incentives to save, to invest, and to produce. If tax rates are cut and govern-
ment expenditures reduced, the income returned to the private sector will 
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provide both the incentive and the wherewithal to invest and to restore pro-
ductivity growth. 
Arthur Laffer, perhaps the most prominent tax-cutting advocate, in-
sists that "tax rate reductions increase employment, output and goods, and 
lower unemployment rates, and lower inflation." 1 He argues further that 
the increase in economic activity resulting from tax cuts will ensure, in a 
very short period of time, that government tax receipts do not fall and pro-
duce large governmental budgetary deficits. Thus, tax cuts are good not only 
for the health of the economy, but also for the health of governmental budgets. 
It is a primary thesis of supply-side economics that aggregate economic 
behavior will respond favorably to increased financial incentives, that is, in-
creased opportunities for profits. Rather than the centralized, collective 
decision making of governments, it is the decentralized, individual decision 
maker that is the most important and most efficient allocator of economic 
resources. Government intervention in the economy impairs the operation 
of market forces and limits the scope of the individual. Economic in-
dividualism, and not interventionistic government policy, is the key to 
economic well-being. 
Yet the emphasis on the market and on individuals is not precise 
enough. Supply-side advocates insist it is the interrelationship of the free 
market and the enterprising individual that is crucial to economic growth. 
Israel Kirzner argues this point very bluntly: 
What institutional frameworks are best suited to tap the reservoir of 
entreprenurial alertness which is certainly present-in potentially inex-
haustible supply-among the members of society? The free market is 
characterized most distinctively . . . by freedom of entreprenurial 
entry. What is important about the market economy is that unexploited 
opportunities for reallocating resources from one use to another of 
higher value offer the opportunity for pure entreprenurial gain. The 
most impressive aspect of the market system is the tendency for such 
opportunities to be discovered. 2 
Socialist economies, or those where government policy inhibits the opera-
tion of the free market, are simply not likely to tap either the advantages of 
the market or of the talented individual. 
Although not explicity stated, supply-side economics subscribes to the 
percolator theory of economic growth, that is, resources should be placed in 
the hands of enterprising individuals who will produce new goods and serv-
ices. The benefits of economic growth will then "percolate" or "trickle" 
downward to workers and consumers. In a moment of candor, David 
Stockman, Reagan's director of the Office of Management and Budget, 
stated that supply-side economic theory was merely "trickle" down 
economics renamed. 3 On the other hand, supply-siders do explicitly argue 
that demand management policies ultimately fail because they place 
resources in the hands of consumers who only exhaust resources rather than 
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create new wealth through the production of goods and services . 
The advocates of supply-side economics reveal a conservative belief 
about how wealth (economic growth) is produced and who produces it. In 
its essence, supply-side economics assumes an elitist theory of economic 
growth. For the supply-sider, the age of the great entrepreneurs offers 
abundant historical evidence to support their point of view. Andrew 
Carnegie, John Davison Rockefeller, and J. Pierpont Morgan epitomize the 
enterprising individual who, in his pursuit of wealth, not only enriched 
himself but society as well. 
Given this view of the nature of economic growth and who is responsi-
ble for growth, it is not surprising that supply-side economics also alters the 
role of the government in the management of economic affairs. Supply-side 
economists insist that a diminished role for government is necessary to in-
crease the efficiency of the market. More importantly, a diminished role for 
government will undo the heavy costs government intervention imposes on 
human freedom. Milton Friedman describes vividly the damage done by 
government intervention: 
We have gone very far in the past fifty years in expanding the role of 
government in the economy. That intervention has been costly in 
economic terms. The limitations imposed on our economic freedom 
threaten to bring two centuries of economic progress to an end. In-
tervention has also been costly in political terms. It has greatly limited 
our human freedom.• 
This view has been whole-heartedly adopted by President Reagan's 
economic advisers. In the Economic Report of the President, 1982, 
prepared by the Council of Economic Advisers, it is asserted that: 
Political freedom and economic freedom are closely related .... No 
nation in which the government has the dominant economic role has 
maintained broad political freedom; economic conditions in such 
countries are generally inferior to those in comparable nations with a 
predominantly market economy. ' 
The call for a diminished role for government is strengthened by 
supply-side advocates who make effective use of the combination of the 
conservative value of economic individualism and the liberal value of 
limited government. In the United States, "Off our backs (politically), and 
out of our pockets (economically)!", is the layman's expression of this com-
plex of sentiments. 
Harkening back to Adam Smith, supply-side economists insist that the 
economic laws of the market operate best in the absence of government in-
terference in the economy. 6 By restraining government intervention in 
economic affairs, the market mechanism is allowed to work more efficiently 
in fixing wages and prices over a greater range of economic activity. 
Economic laws are "naturally" superior to the "artificial" policies of 
governments. Furthermore, such economic laws operate in a far less ar-
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bitrary fashion than do the economic policies of government. In this sense, 
economic laws are neutral and do not produce the "unnatural" allocations 
of economic rewards that the distributional policies of Keynesian economics do. 
Under supply-side economics the government acts as a facilitator 
rather than as a regulator and director. The overall effect of this change in 
the role of the government in the economy from an active intervenor to that 
of facilitator will be a dramatic improvement in the functioning of the 
economy and a surge of healthy growth in investment, output, and productivity. 
Thus, the economic policies of supply-siders are bound to differ 
substantially in form and content from the demand management economic 
policies of Keynesians. Yet, it is not the differences in economic policies be-
tween these two schools of thought that are most crucial. It is the triad of 
economic assumptions of supply-side economists-the nature of economic 
growth and who is most likely to produce growth, the proper role of the 
government vis-a-vis the economy, and the "natural" superiority of 
economic laws over governmental economic policy-that is most crucial to 
an understanding of the economic policies of the supply-side advocate. 
These assumptions form the foundation for the specifics of supply-side 
economic policy. It is on this bedrock of conservative convictions that 
governmental economic policy is to be built. 
Given these economic assumptions, it is not surprising that the 
economic policies of the Thatcher government and the Reagan administra-
tion are remarkably similar. In the brief compass of this paper, it is not 
possible to examine these policies in any great detail. Rather, the economic 
policies of both governments are grouped under five general headings. The 
policies that fall under each heading are then outlined. 
COMPARISONS OF THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF THE THATCHER 
GOVERNMENT AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 
Both the Thatcher government and the Reagan administration have set 
out their economic goals in bold terms. In the Financial Statement and 
Budget Report, 1981-1982, Sir Geoffery Howe, Chancellor of the Exchequer 
states: "The Government's objectives for the medium-term are to bring 
down the rate of inflation and to create the conditions for a sustainable 
growth of output and employment. It is committed to a progressive reduc-
tion in the growth of the money stock and to pursuing the fiscal policies 
necessary to achieve this without excessive reliance on interest rates. " 1 The 
unwavering determination of the Thatcher government to reach these goals 
can be grasped by noting that an almost identical policy statement can be 
found in the Financial Statement and Budget Report for the previous and 
following years. Furthermore, the budget for 1982-83 clearly indicates that 
the prime minister, despite strong pressure from within her own party, was 
adhering closely to her plans for economic recovery. 
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Whereas the British statement on economic policy is stated with quiet 
determination, the American position on economic policy is a clarion call. 
In testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee in January 1981, 
David Stockman, the director of the Office of Management and Budget, 
proclaimed: 
The administration will shortly propose a bold, innovative economic 
recovery plan integrating the classical economic principles of sound 
budget policy, sound tax policy and sound money. The plan will be a 
clear break with past policy. The principal elements of the plan will in-
clude slowing budget growth, reducing tax rates, curbing and stabiliz-
ing monetary growth, and lightening the regulatory burden .... The 
results will be a speedy recovery of the financial markets, accelerated 
real growth, and reduced inflation, as saving and investment rise, 
deficits fall and the market system works more efficiently." 8 
Despite the mixed signals of the 1982 Congressional elections, a worsening 
rate of unemployment, and a painfully slow recovery from recession, Presi-
dent Reagan has indicated his determination to "stay the course." 
Virtually all the policy steps taken by Mrs. Thatcher and Mr. Reagan 
are no more than an attempt to implement the ideas outlined in these brief 
statements. Ultimately, the test for both nations is whether the premises of 
supply-side economics and the policies flowing from them, will in fact lead 
to the desired results. The similarities in the economic policies of the two 
governments are quite striking despite significant differences between Great 
Britain and the United States in terms of political institutions, the size of the 
respective economies, and the differing degrees of economic 
interdependence. 
SIMILARITIES 
Before sketching the similarities in the economic policies, it is impor-
tant to note that it is the combination of policy steps and the economic en-
vironment created by those policy steps that is crucial to the supply-side vi-
sion of a healthy economy. Thus, it is a mistake to focus on any particular 
policy. The supply-side policies of Reagan and Thatcher cannot be reduced 
to simple monetarism. Instead it is the combination of policies and the 
economic environment resulting from them that is expected to reverse com-
pletely the notion that the economy stands in almost constant need of 
government intervention. 
Two caveats are also necessary before proceeding. First, although im-
portant differences in details exist, the economic policies are presented 
without specifying the details which would obscure the basic similarities. 
For example, in Great Britain the prime minister's budgetary policies are af-
fected by the level of unemployment in ways that is not true for the United 
States. The Thatcher budget, unlike the Reagan budget, must allocate a 
significantly greater amount of resources to the unemployed. Second, con-
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siderably less attention is paid, from this point on, to the policy contrasts 
between Keynesians and supply-siders. Nonetheless, it should be noted here 
that Keynesians insist that supply-side economic policies are having precisely 
the negative consequences they predicted. Supply-siders respond in two 
ways. One response is that supply-side policies will not begin to produce 
favorable results until the damage done by demand management policies is 
corrected. A second response comes from the ideological purists. They in-
sist that supply-side theories are not being given a real test; too many devia-
tions from supply-side theory have become part and parcel of the economic 
policies of both regimes. 
FISCAL RESTRAINT: 
Both the Thatcher government and the Reagan administration have 
called for fiscal restraint. Both regimes have attempted to cut their respec-
tive budgets with the aim of producing, in the long run, a balanced budget. 
This has not meant an absolute decline in the level of government spending 
but rather a slowing of budgetary growth. Despite the persistence of the cur-
rent recession, both leaders have reiterated their determination in their most 
recent budgets to resist pressures to reflate the economy in any substantial 
or significant way. 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
SOURCES: 
TABLE l 
BUDGETARY GROWTH IN GREAT BRITAIN 
AND THE UNITED STATES, 1975-1982 
Great Britain United States 
(1980 Survey Prices) (1982 Constant Dollars) 
Pounds in Millions Dollars in Billions 
81,283 $260.2 
79,202 $274.3 
74,375 $280.6 
77,951 $293.8 
77,776 $297 .2 
79,245 $316.7 
79,225 $327 .5 
77,900 (est.) $338.7 
The Government's Expenditures Plans, Total Public Expen-
diture by Programme, Command 8175 (1980-81), and Com-
mand 8494 (1981-82). 
The United States Budget in Brief, Fiscal Year 1984, Composi-
tion of Budget Outlays in Current and Constant Prices. 
The table above reveals quite clearly that budgetary growth in Great 
Britain and the United States had already slowed before the election of 
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. By holding prices and dollars con-
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stant, the real growth in government spending in both nations can be 
charted. The Thatcher government has called for a reduction in government 
spending as a proportion of gross domestic product from 45 percent in 
1981-82 to 44.5 percent in 1982-83 and 41 percent in 1984-85. 9 President 
Reagan in a television address to the . American nation on September 24, 
1982, claimed; "The budget bill that I signed this summer cut $35 billion 
from the 1982 budget and slowed the growth of spending by $130 billion 
over the next three years. We cut the government's rate of growth nearly in 
half." 10 The second round of budget cuts, amounting to more than $13 
billion, announced in that same speech dramatically highlighted the 
Reagan's administration plan to slow budgetary growth during fiscal 1983. 
Yet even deeper cuts would not enable his administration to reach the target 
of a balanced budget in fiscal 1984. Indeed, the Reagan budget for fiscal 
1984 projected deficits of $188.8 billion, $194.2 billion, and $147.7 billion 
for fiscal I 984, 1985, and 1986 respectively. 11 
These projections have led to considerable debate among supply-siders 
as to where the American economy stands on the "Laffer curve." If the 
economy is on the left side of the curve, as former Assistant Secretary of the 
Treasury Paul Roberts insists, then tax increases will not unduly impair 
economic incentives and will aid the government in reducing the budgetary 
deficits. On the other hand, Arthur Laffer maintains that the economy is on 
the right side of the curve and tax increases will further damage economic 
incentives and will further widen the gap between tax receipts and govern-
ment expenditures. 
Slowing budgetary growth is also in accord with the perceived need to 
return resources to the private sector. The crushing size of governmental 
budgets and their ensuing deficits sop up funds that the private sector 
desperately needs if growth in investment, output, and productivity is to 
occur. Only by slowing the growth of government, supply-side advocates in-
sist, will it be possible to find the resources necessary to healthy growth. 
MONETARY RESTRAINT: 
Both regimes have called for the safeguard of firm monetary control. 
In practice, this has meant tight money and high interest rates. The aim of 
both governments is to curb and stabilize monetary growth. Prime Minister 
Thatcher has maintained that the "major innovation" in the Brisish budget 
since she took office is a plan that outlines a "progressive reduction in 
monetary growth over a period of years." Budget plans also "set out a com-
plementary path of declining public expenditures and public sector borrow-
ing" that will hasten the achievement of a stable money supply. 12 
In the United States the Chairman of the Federal Reserve System, 
Mr. Paul Volcker, has reiterated time and time again, that curbing the 
growth in the money stock is the only sure way to dampen inflationary 
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tendencies deeply embedded in the American economy. In July of 1981, he 
pointed out to the Joint Economic Committee of Congress the dangers of 
reversing present monetary policy: "If the Federal Reserve .. . were to 
deviate from its policy of monetary restraint in an effort to lower interest 
rates, any seeming short-run relief would have to be balanced against the 
substantial risk-for the United States and the rest of the world-of ex-
cessive credit growth, a further hardening of inflationary expectations and 
still greater interest rate pressures in the future.'' 1 3 Despite public attacks by 
Reagan administration officials, including Donald Regan, Secretary of 
Treasury, The Economic Report of the President, 1982 affirmed that the 
Federal Reserve System's monetary policies were substantially in line with 
the President's economic policies. 1• 
The Thatcher government and the Reagan administration see the 
restraining of monetary growth as necessary not only to dampen infla-
tionary pressures, but also to establish monetary rules or targets. These 
targets are more explicitly stated in Great Britain given its somewhat greater 
emphasis on monetary policy. Thus, the growth of M3 in 1982-83, Sir 
Geoffrey Howe declared, will be in the "target range" of "8 to 12 
percent." 15 Monetary rules or targets are, supply-siders insist, indispensable 
guides that provide the necessary predictability to economic actors in the 
free market. 16 Without such guides, the investment climate is deeply uncer-
tain and investors will be reluctant to undertake economic expansion in such an 
environment. Supply-side advocates argue that the volatility of the stock 
market in both nations is primarily due to the absence of explicit monetary 
rules, or worse, a failure by governmental officials to stick to a consistent 
monetary policy. TABLE 2 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
INTEREST RATES IN GREAT BRITAIN 
AND THE UNITED STATES, 1973-1982 
Great Britain United States 
(Base Lending Rate) (Prime Rate) 
13.0 8.01 
12.0 9.78 
11.0 7.86 
14.0 6.84 
6.75-7.5 6.82 
12.5 9.06 
17.0 12.67 
14.0 15.27 
14.5 18.75 
11.75 14.86 
SOURCES: Economic Trends, Interest Rates, Security Prices and Yields 
Federal Reserve Bulletin, The Prime Rate Charges by Banks 
on Short-Term Business Loans 
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The table above details interest rates since 1973. Neither nation has 
seemingly been able to achieve a stable growth in the money supply without 
incurring the highest interest rates in the history of either nation. 
TAX CUTS: 
Both the Prime Minister and the President have insisted on across the 
board tax cuts. Mrs. Thatcher has cut income taxes and the national in-
surance surcharge, but has raised the value added tax significantly during 
her tenure. In both nations across the board cuts have, in fact, been 
weighted in favor of upper income groups, and those most likely to be the 
producers of economic growth. The lowering of the tax rate on capital gains 
in the United States is a clear example. President Reagan has also been suc-
cessful in pushing through Congress a tax bill that includes an accelerated 
depreciation schedule for capital equipment. Such provisions are intended 
to enhance capital investment and counter the decline in productivity. Yet 
despite the tax cuts, as a result of social insurance tax increases, value-added 
tax increases, "bracket creep," and the adoption of "revenue enhance-
ment" measures and "user fees," real taxes are still rising for most income 
groups in both countries. Nor do continued budgetary deficits offer any 
hope that real taxes will decline in the foreseeable future. 
Nonetheless, the Reagan tax proposals are designed to be an "integral 
part of the comprehensive economic program" to improve "the after-tax, 
after-inflation rewards to work, saving, and investment."" In Great 
Britain, proposed changes in taxation reach across the entire range of tax 
policies from income taxes to customs and excise taxes. 11 
Lower tax rates, particularly on interest, dividends, capital gains, and 
corporate income, will produce, supply-side advocates maintain, an increase 
in output by enhancing financial incentives to save and to invest. Tax cuts 
on wages will increase both the incentive to work and the supply of labor. 
Thus, decreasing taxes on all income levels, but especially upper income 
groups, will restore incentives to both producers and workers and bring 
about a real expansion of aggregate output. Moreover, a cut in tax rates, 
certain advocates of the "Laffer curve" insist, is necessary to boost tax 
receipts. '9 Tax rates are now so punitive that further upward adjustments 
will actually lead to falling rather than rising tax receipts. 
REVIVE PRIVATE ENTERPRISE: 
Thatcher and Reagan both see a multi-pronged effort as necessary to 
restore the private sector to full health. 20 In addition to the tax provisions 
noted above, both regimes have called for a lightening of the regulatory 
burden. A reduction in the number of regulations will allow the market to 
function more efficiently. Since capital investment is such a critical factor in 
economic growth, both leaders view a closer relationship between govern-
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ment and industry as essential to ensuring adequate amounts of capital in-
vestment in the appropriate industries. Although this may at first appear as 
irreconcilable with the supply-side vision of a diminished role for govern-
ment, it is only a superficial irreconcilability. When it is recalled that 
government should act as a facilitator of healthy economic growth, govern-
ment involvement in investment decisions is then seen as natural and 
appropriate. 
Government involvement, however, will differ between the two na-
tions. President Reagan insists that "the most appropriate role for govern-
ment economic policy is to provide a stable and unfettered environment in 
which private individuals can confidently plan and make appropriate deci-
sions .. . . Establishing an environment which ensures efficient and stable 
incentives for work, saving, and investment now and in the future is the corner-
stone of the recovery plan. " 21 By contrast, the British governmental role is 
more positive. Sir Geoffrey Howe declared that "measures to encourage 
enterprises and risk taking are essential if we are to replace the jobs that are 
disappearing elsewhere in the Economy. We must be ready to set aside the 
resources to encourage them .... This Budget has been designed ... to help 
redress the balance of the economy in favor of business and industry." 22 In 
the Budget Statement for 1982-83, the chancellor affirmed that "our prime 
purpose is to help private commerce and industry to help itself by cutting its 
costs" and that the "paramount aim of this Budget is to help industry, to 
encourage business, and to create jobs. " 23 
Given the aging industrial plants of both nations, Reagan and Thatcher 
see an important governmental role in reindustrialization. In several ways, 
such a governmental role recalls the early days of industrialization. In the 
middle and late 19th century the American and British governments actually 
assisted in the capital accumulation process by thwarting efforts by farmers 
to have rates regulated, by labor to organize and bargain collectively, and 
by consumers to prevent monopoly pricing. Supply-side advocates insist 
that reindustrialization need not be accompanied by the abuses that were a 
part of the first stages of industrialization. They point to the many govern-
mental policies, such as unemployment and retirement benefits, that 
supply-siders would leave largely intact, and which would prevent a re-
currence of earlier abuses. 
MORE MONEY FOR DEFENSE: 
Great Britain and the United States see the Soviet Union as a threat to 
world peace. Thus, Reagan and Thatcher have called for increases in 
defense spending over the next several years. Given their supply-side 
economic views, this is one of the very few areas where an increase in 
governmental spending is viewed as legitimate. The Thatcher government is 
calling for a real 3 percent increase in defense spending each year during the 
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period 1981-82 to 1984-85. 2• A substantial fraction of this increased spend-
ing will go toward the purchase of the American Trident missile. Despite the 
burden increased defense expenditures place on plans for economic 
recovery, the prime minister shows no sign of retreating from this position 
despite widespread opposition from the Labor Party, and the new alliance 
between the Liberals and the Social Democrats. 
The case is even more extreme in the United States where President 
Reagan announced a plan that calls for a $180 billion increase in defense 
spending over the next decade . As a consequence: 
Real military spending is expected to grow 9 percent annually between 
1981 and 1987. Over that period, military spending will rise from 5.6 
percent to 7 .8 percent of GNP, and from 25 percent to 37 percent of 
total Federal spending. 25 
Although America already bears the greatest per capita burden of any na-
tion for defense spending, the Reagan plan will add to that burden. The 
adverse effects of this increased expenditure will be partially offset by a 
reduction in expenditures for social programs. But, even the president's 
closest advisers concede that such a level of defense spending will impair the 
administration's efforts to strengthen the economy. 26 
This review of American and British economic policies documents the 
overwhelming similarities of those policies. Only in isolated instances do the 
policies diverge from one another, and even there it is a matter of emphasis 
rather than a fundamental difference. The economic policies of both na-
tions rest on the supply-side vision of how the economy works and what is 
necessary to restore the economy to full health. Finally, both governments 
appear determined, even in the face of short-run economic setbacks, to pur-
sue virtually unchanged the policies they set out at the beginning of their 
administration. 
DIFFERENCES: 
There are several differences that limit the comparability of the 
economic policies of the Thatcher government and the Reagan administra-
tion. Yet the differences that exist fall largely outside the arena of economic 
policy. The supply-side economic philosophy that underpins the economic 
policies in both countries ensures that any differences in policy are likely to 
be traced to noneconomic rather than economic factors. 
INSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENCES: 
The most obvious institutional differences include: a parliamentary 
system with responsible parties versus a presidential system with decen-
tralized parties, a unitary system versus a federal system, and unified con-
trol of the monetary system versus a fragmented control of the monetary 
system. Given the importance of monetary policy to both regimes, the last 
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difference might be perceived as crucial. But this difference is only of limited 
significance because, as noted earlier, Paul Volcker, the chairman of the 
Federal Reserve System, is sympathetic to Reagan's economic policies, Not-
withstanding Mr. Volcker's sympathies, the Reagan administration has, on 
occasion, attempted to use the Federal Reserve System as a scapegoat for 
high interest rates, and pointed to its monetary policies as one of the factors 
slowing economic recovery. 
Despite these institutional differences, both Thatcher and Reagan have 
shown that determined leadership can overcome institutional obstacles and 
produce very similar economic policies. Furthermore, they have 
demonstrated that executive leadership is viewed as the key to the resolution 
of economic problems and such leadership cannot be challenged successfully 
even by determined legislative opposition. Finally, the two leaders have 
shown that a decisive reversal in economic policy from Keynesian demand 
management measures to supply-side measures can occur under quite dif-
ferent institutional frameworks. 
DIFFERENCES IN THE SIZE OF THE ECONOMIES: 
The American economy, as the table below reveals, dwarfs the British 
economy. The greater size of the American economy has two important 
consequences for the economic policies of both nations. First, the sheer 
magnitude of the American economy ensures that any development in that 
economy will have a significant impact on the British economy and, indeed, 
on the world economy. As a consequence, British economic policy must 
react to economic events in America in ways that need not concern Reagan's 
economic advisers. 
Secondly, the greater size and complexity of the American economy 
limits the "fine-tuning" that economic policies can provide. This may be 
somewhat of an advantage because American economic advisers probably 
have a greater margin for error in forecasting the consequences of any given 
set of economic policies. By contrast, British economic advisers must func-
tion in a setting where outside events can have far-reaching effects, and 
where errors in forecasting can quickly produce adverse effects on economic 
performance. 
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TABLE 3 
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT FOR GREAT BRITAIN 
AND THE UNITED STATES, 1973-1982 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
Great Britain 
(Pounds in Milljons) 
74.3 
84.5 
105.5 
125.9 
143.9 
166.0 
194.3 
225.8 
249.4 
United States 
(Dollars in Billions) 
1,252.0 
1,379.4 
1,479.9 
1,640.1 
1,862.8 
2,091.3 
2,357.7 
2,573.9 
2,871.8 
3,033.0 
SOURCE: Economic Trends, Factor Incomes in the Gross National 
Product 
United States Budget in Brief, Fiscal Year 1984, Federal 
Finances and the Gross National Product, 1965-85. 
DIFFERENCES WITH REGARD TO ECONOMIC 
INTERDEPENDENCE: 
Closely related to differences in size is the differing degrees of the in-
terdependence of the economies of Great Britain and the United States. The 
American economy is much more self-contained than the British economy. 
The gross domestic product of the United States is sufficiently large to 
enable agriculture, manufacturing, and service industries to operate at an 
optimal level. In addition, the sheer size of the domestic market provides 
numerous and extensive opportunities for American firms to take advan-
tage of, and benefit from, economies of scale not available to their British 
counterparts. Only in the case of agriculture, where American farmers are 
so efficient, is the export market deemed an essential factor in a healthy 
agricultural sector and political pressure mobilized to protect agricultural 
exports. 
By contrast, the British economy is heavily dependent on the 
economies of other nations. A significant fraction of Britain's gross na-
tional product (GNP) is directly attributable to foreign trade. Indeed, 
foreign trade accounts for 29 percent of Britain's GNP, whereas foreign 
trade accounts for only 9 percent of American GNP. 21 Given their smaller 
domestic economy, British businesses must seek access to the domestic 
market of other nations. The greater interdependence of Britain's economy 
is perhaps the most important factor that limits the success of British 
capitalism as compared to the success of American capitalism. 
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Overall, American economic advisers have an easier task than British 
advisers. With a largely self-contained economy, American economic 
policies can be formulated without undue concern for economic conditions 
in other countries. Furthermore, the full impact of such policies is less likely 
to be impaired by outside forces. British economic advisers, on the other 
hand, must function in an economic environment characterized by in-
terdependence and where world economic conditions can adversely affect 
the intended effects of economic policy. Yet, despite these differences 
supply-side theory ensures that the economic policies of both nations retain 
their essential similarity. 
IMPACT OF SUPPLY-SIDE ECONOMIC POLICIES 
Given the limited purpose of this paper, it will not be possible to ex-
plore the impact of the economic policies of the Thatcher government and 
the Reagan administration in any detail. Rather, this section points to 
several issues that must be addressed before the consequences of supply-side 
economic policies can be ascertained. These measurement issues are 
primarily of interest to economists. Yet political scientists have increasingly 
expressed interest in the impact side of public policy analysis. Thus, a brief 
review is appropriate. 
A lowering of the inflation rate, a reduction in unemployment, and in-
creased productivity, would seem to be indicators that signal the impact of 
supply-side economic policies. However, care must be taken to establish a 
casual link (if possible) between improved economic indicators and supply-
side economic policies. This is an exceedingly difficult task. Econometri-
cians have grappled with these kinds of problems with not altogether 
satisfactory results. 
Attention must also be paid to time frames. After more than four years 
there should be some ways to measure the long-term impact of Thatcher's 
policies. 21 Yet British economic advisers now claim that a minimum period 
of three to six years is necessary before the government's economic policies 
will begin to reverse the present decline and produce positive results. The 
chancellor acknowledged in his March 1982 Budget Statement that "revers-
ing this decline would require a major effort, an effort that would need to 
be sustained over the lifetime of more than one parliament." 29 After nearly 
three years the short-run effects of Reagan's policies should be beginning to 
appear. In both countries inflation rates have fallen significantly, but 
unemployment continues to rise. No long term trends with regard to pro-
ductivity growth are as yet discernible. Obviously, more time must pass if 
supply-side economic policies are to be given a full test. Keynesians, of 
course, are already convinced that such policies will have disastrous conse-
quences. Supply-siders are equally convinced that the reverse is true. 
If the debate between these two schools of thought cannot be resolved, 
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perhaps economic policy needs to be looked at from a larger point of view. 
A number of authors argue that the present economic malaise is not due to 
the narrow problem of deciding which set of economic policies to pursue at 
all. 30 Rather, they suggest that industrial civilization has exhausted itself. 
Robert Heilbroner, for example, insists that "the values of an industrial 
civilization, which for two centuries have given us a sense of elan and pur-
pose, now seem to be losing their self-evident justification. 3 ' He restates and 
amplifies this position in several works particularly Business Civilization in 
Decline. 32 
The waning of the industrial spirit is perhaps even more acute in Great 
Britain . According to Martin Wiener, the British people, and particularly 
the British elites, have never fully acceded to the transformations wrought 
by the industrial revolution. Indeed, this failure may be the downfall of 
Prime Minister Thatcher's economic plans . Wiener writes: "The least tract-
able obstacle of British economic 'redevelopment' may well be the continu-
ing resistance of cultural values and attitudes." 33 He persuasively 
documents this thesis with telling evidence from virtually every aspect of 
British life. 
Even in the absence of the waning of the values of industrial civiliza-
tion cited by Heilbroner, or the cultural resistance cited by Wiener, 
economic growth has, according to Fred Hirsch, inherent social limits. He 
argues forcefully that growth is limited in two major ways: 
First-the paradox of affluence-economic growth in advanced 
societies carries some elements of built-in frustration: the growth pro-
cess, when sustained and generalized, fails to deliver its full promise. 
Economic growth runs into social scarcity. Second-the reluctant col-
lectivism-continuation of the growth process itself rests on certain 
moral pre-conditions that its own success has jeopardized through its 
individualistic ethos. Economic growth undermines its social foundations. 3• 
Thus, from a number of different starting points with differing degrees of 
sophistication and rigor the cultural analysis converges in such a way that 
virtually every conceivable route out of the present economic malaise is 
closed. Only a transformation of industrial civilization, these authors in-
timate, can alter the landscape of the future. Moreover, their writings may 
contain some unhappy truths about the prospects for a renewal of economic 
growth in America and Britain. If their arguments have any validity, 
economic policies, regardless of their ideological roots, will have only a very 
limited impact on economic conditions. Unfortunately, it will be extremely 
difficult to develop the tools to assess these cultural arguments. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has explored the problems that produced a political turn to 
the right in Great Britain and the United States. Disaffection with Keynesian 
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policies led to the election of leaders determined to adopt supply-side 
measures. These measures rest on economic assumptions that are deeply 
conservative in nature-an elitist theory of economic growth, a limited role 
for government in restoring economic health, and a belief in the "natural" 
superiority of economic laws and the market as the most efficient resource 
allocators. The economic policies of both nations, built on these premises, 
have been shown to be remarkably similar. Although differences do exist, 
the differences fall largely outside the arena of economic policy making, 
and thus do not significantly affect the policies adopted by both regimes as 
a part of their recovery plans. 
Given the limitations of supply-side policies, it is clear that they will not 
replace entirely countercyclical Keynesian policies in either nation. Keyne-
sian policies have proven to be an appropriate response to recessions that 
are the result of business cycle fluctuations. Despite the post-war expansion, 
supply-siders insist Keynesian policies are not well-suited to improving long 
term economic growth while preserving price stability. The supply-side 
argument is simple: in the post-war era all the conditions for sustained 
economic growth were present. It was merely a historical accident that 
Keynesians were in power. If supply-siders had been in power, growth 
would have been even greater. 
Another weakness of demand management policies is that over the 
long term they do not necessarily increase incentives to save, to invest, and 
to produce. Supply-side policies purport to increase precisely these incen-
tives. Unfortunately, supply-side policies work slowly and it is a serious 
question whether elected public officials can risk, or are willing to risk, 
waiting until such policies begin to have the favorable impacts of robust ex-
pansion, new investment and new jobs, when elections seem always just 
around the corner. 
Finally, the issue of which is the appropriate set of economic 
policies-Keynesian demand management measures or supply-side 
measures-for restoring the economies of Great Britain and the United 
States to full health may be hopelessly irrelevant. Serious authors from a 
wide range of backgrounds and perspectives have argued that the economic 
malaise plaguing both nations can best be traced to the exhaustion of in-
dustrial values rather than to any particular set of economic policies. If this 
cultural analysis is valid, the debate over economic policy between Keyne-
sians and supply-siders is worse than futile. 
Obviously, more research is necessary, and more time must pass, 
before the impact of competing economic policies on economic perfor-
mance can be fully measured. More research and more time is also 
necessary before the tools can be developed to assess the cultural analysis. In 
the interim, both nations appear fated to suffer fluctuating rates of infla-
tion, socially unacceptable levels of unemployment, and agonizingly slow 
economic growth that is periodically interrupted by recessions. 
111 
Notes 
'" The New Economics: A Debate," Economic Impact, No. 35, 1981, p. 24. Arthur Laffer 
is the supply-side theorist with the greatest influence with the Reagan Administration . A sam-
ple of his views can be found in: A. B. Laffer and B. C. Conley , "Interplay of Taxes, Output, 
and Fiscal Policy, " Tax Executive, 30:336- 338 + {July 1978), and A. B. Laffer and J.C . 
Turney, "Global Monetary Policy : Implications for the United States and Gold," Journal of 
Social and Political Studies, 5:3-38 {Spring/ Summer 1980). 
' I. M. Kirzner, "The Primacy of Entreprenurial Discovery, " pp. 13, 17, 18, in : Prime 
Mover of Progress: The Entrepreneur in Capitalism and Socialism (London : The Institute of 
Economic Affairs, 1980). 
' Quoted in W. Grieder, "The Education of David Stockman," The Atlantic Monthly, 
December 1981, pp . 46- 47. Stockman 's candid views were also the subject of major stories in 
the November 23, 1981 issues of Newsweek and Time. 
'M . F . and R. F. Friedman, Free to Choose (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books 
Ltd. , 1980), p. 88. 
'C ouncil of Economic Advisers, The Economic Report of the President, 1982 
(Washington, D.C .: Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 27. Hereafter cited as Economic 
Report 1982. This report includes, in many places, an exposition of the assumptions of supply-
side economics. 
'G. Gilder, Wealth and Poverty (New York : Basic Books, 1980), is a modern restatement 
of Adam Smith's classic Wealth of Nations. Gilder's argument s as to the causes of contem-
porary society's economic malaise echo Smith's thesis that government interference in the 
economy impairs the-effectiveness and the efficiency of economic law. See also Friedman, cited 
at note 4, pp . 48- 54, for his analysis of Smith's thinking on the proper role of government. 
'Financial Statement and Budget Report, 1981-82, Parliamentary Paper 197 (Session 
1980-81), p. 16. Hereafter cited as Financial Statement 1981-82. 
'Statement of David A. Stockman, Director, Office of Management and Budget, Before 
the Senate Appropriations Committee, January 23, 1981, pp . 3-4 . 
' Financial Statement and Budget Report, 1982-83, Parliamentary Paper 237 (Session 
1981- 82), p. 16. Hereafter cited as Financial Statement 1982-83. 
'
0Text of an addres s by the President to the Nation, The White House, Office of the Press 
Secretary, September 24, 1981, p. 2. Also mentioned in The United States Budget in Brief, 
Fiscal Year 1983 (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1982), p . 6. Hereafter cited 
as U.S. Budget 1983. 
11 The United States Budget in Brief, Fiscal Year 1984 (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1983), p. 84. 
" Financial Statement 1981-82, cited at note 7, p. 22. 
" Statement by Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, Before the Joint Economic Committee, July 16, 1981, in Federal Reserve Bulletin, 
August 1981, pp. 610-613 at p . 612. 
"Economic Report 1982, cited at note 5, pp. 63-64 . 
""Budget Statement," House of Commons Parliamentary Debates, Weekly Hansard, 
Vol. 19, Issue 1235, 6th March to 12th March, 1982, col. 733. Hereafter cited as "Budget 
Statement 1982-83." 
"The arguments for monetary targets are examined in: Monetary Targets and Inflation 
Control, OECD Monetary Studies, (Washington, D.C.: OECD, 1979). 
" "America's New Beginning: A Program for Economic Recovery," A White House 
Report, February 18, 1981, p. 14. Hereafter cited as "America's New Beginning." 
""Budget Statement 1982-83," cited at note 15, cols. 741- 746, 754-755. Financial State-
ment 1982- 83, cited at note 9, pp . 5- 11. 
"These arguments are appraised in: A. Protopapadakis, "Supply-Side Economics: What 
Chance for Success?," Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, May-June 
1981, pp . 11- 20. 
'
0The following sources should be consulted for the details of the multipronged effort to 
revitalize the economy. For Great Britain : "Budget Statement 1982-83," cited at note 15; 
Financial Statement 1982-83, cited at note 9; and The Government's Expenditure Plans, 
1982-83 to 1984-85, Command 8495-1 and II (Session 1981-82). Hereafter cited as The 
Government's Expenditure Plans 1982-83. For the United States : "America's New 
Beginning," cited at note 17; The Economic Report of the President (1982), cited at note 5; 
and "President Reagan's Program for Economic Recovery ," The White House, April 1981. 
""America's New Beginning," cited at note 17, p. 24. 
" "Budget Statement," House of Commons Parliamentary Debates, Weekly Hansard, 
112 
Vol. 18, Issue 1199, 6th March to 12th March, 1981, col. 781. 
""Budget Statement 1982-83," cited at note 15, cols. 741, 756. 
"The Government's Expenditure Plans 1982-83, II, cited at note 20, p. 4. 
" Economic Report 1982, cited at note 5, p. 85. 
"For the economic impact of defense spending, see: J . R. Capra, "The National Defense 
Budget and its Economic Effects," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
6(2): 21-31 (Summer 1981). 
" World Bank, World Development Report, 1981, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1982), Table 5, Structure of Demand, pp. 142- 43. The figures are for 1979. 
"British economic policy has been analyzed in: R. E . Caves and L.B. Krause, eds., Bri-
tain's Economic Performance (Washington, D.C. : Brookings, 1980), and M. Stewart, Politics 
and Economic Policy in the United Kingdom since 1964 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1978). 
" "Budget Statement 1982- 83," cited at note 15, col. 727. 
" Some of the more important cultural critiques are: M. Harrington, The Twilight of 
Capitalism (New York: Touchstone Books, 1977), M. W. Kirby, The Decline of British 
Economic Power since 1870 (London: Allen and Un win, 1981), C. Lasch, The Culture of Nar-
cissism (New York : Warner Books, 1979), and L. S. Stavrianos , The Promise of the Coming 
Dark Age (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1976). 
" R. L. Heilbroner, An Inquiry into the Human Prospect (New York: Norton, 1980), 
p . 19. 
" R. L. Heilbroner, Business Civilization in Decline (London : M . Boyars, 1977). 
" M . Wiener, English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850-/980 (Lon-
don : Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 163. 
" F. Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (London: Routlege and Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 175. 
113 
